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Abstract 
 Using a randomized experiment in rural Malawi, this paper finds that providing 
information on mobile bank buses’ services leads to a higher probability of adopting savings 
accounts in the treatment group. Households in the treated villages are 3.06 percentage points 
more likely to adopt savings accounts than households in the control group. Second, the 
information treatment leads to an increase of in the probability of households receiving 
remittances in the treated villages, as well as an increase in the amount of remittances received. 
In particular, the effect is strongest for households that lived at least three kilometers away from 
the trade centers, which suggests that the main cost of transferring remittance is the cost of 
traveling to a bank. Third, the 2SLS regression provides suggestive evidence that adopting 
savings accounts leads to an increase in households’ remittance activities. The 63.3 percentage 
points increase in the possibility of households receiving remittances after adopting savings 
accounts suggests that there previously exist high costs associated with the informal channels of 
transferring remittances.  
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I. Introduction 
 
   Access to formal savings is restricted in developing countries (Chaia et al., 2009, Kendall 
et al,. 2010). For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, only 15percentage points of people have a 
bank account (Aggarwal et al., 2011). An increasing amount of evidence shows that the poor are 
willing and able to save. However, due to lack of access to formal savings, the poor use informal 
mechanisms such as lending to a friend or relative, putting money under the mattress, investing 
in livestock and jewelry, and depositing daily income with money collectors or in savings clubs. 
These informal channels are risky and inefficient. Consequently, they limit the scope of savings.  
As a result, providing access to formal modes of saving greatly encourages the poor to 
save and improve household welfare in a number of dimensions. First, it helps smooth household 
consumption during a period of negatives shocks by utilizing savings in durables and non-
financial assets (Deaton, 1992). Second, it saves a significant amount of interests paid on 
borrowing, as the yearly interest rate in the informal money market can range from 40% to 
200%. (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005).
1
 Third, it provides capital for investments, such as on 
children’s education, small business ventures, health and so on, which potentially provides a path 
out of poverty for the poor (Prina, 2012; Ashraf, 2006; Aportela, 1999; Dupas and Robinson, 
2009). Lastly, households increase work on the wage market when savings options improve, 
which results in a more efficient labor allocation (Callen et al. 2014). 
2
 
         The motivating question of this study is whether facilitating formal savings can promote 
money flows between migrant workers and their families − formally defined as “remittances.”  
Remittances are seen as an important source of income for millions of families in developing 
                                               
1
 Aleem 1990 finds the average annual interest rate charged by the money lenders in Pakistan was 78.5percentage 
points.  
2
 Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993), and Banerjee (2004) identify different mechanisms 
through which access to savings facilities can enable individuals to change their production and employment 
choices, and thereby exit poverty. 
3 
countries. Balde (2010) shows that the remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa have a direct 
poverty mitigating effect and promoted financial development.
3
  
This paper uses a study conducted by the IRIS (Institutional Reform and the Informal 
Sector) Center at the University of Maryland, and examines if having access to formal savings 
accounts will change people’s behavior of sending and receiving remittances. The experiment 
took place in 2008 when there was an expansion of formal savings access through mobile bank 
buses in Malawi. The expansion rolled out from the capital city of Malawi and headed to two 
different directions. The buses made regular stops at six different trading centers to provide basic 
savings accounts to people.  
The experiment was an information intervention, which changed the amount of 
information people received in the treatment group. In one set of villages that received the 
“information treatment,” trained assistants walked to households and provided information on 
buses’ stops and hours. In the control villages, households did not receive visits from the trained 
assistants; but, they were at liberty to find out the information on buses’ services on their own.    
First, this paper finds that providing information on mobile bank buses’ services leads to 
a higher probability of adopting savings accounts in the treatment group. Households in the 
treated villages are 3.06 percentage points more likely to adopt savings accounts than households 
in the control group. Second, the information treatment leads to an increase of in the probability 
of households receiving remittances in the treated villages, as well as an increase in the amount 
of remittances received. In particular, the effect is strongest for households that lived at least 
three kilometers away from the trade centers, which suggests that the main cost of transferring 
remittance is the cost of traveling to a bank. Third, the 2SLS regression provides suggestive 
                                               
3
 Balde (2010) investigates the impact of remittances on savings and investment in sub-Shaharan Africa. He finds 
that remittances are not entirely spent in basic consumption needs. Compared to foreign aid, Balde finds that 
remittances have more positive impact on savings and investment.  
4 
evidence that adopting savings accounts leads to an increase in households’ remittance activities. 
The 63.3 percentage points increase in the possibility of households receiving remittances after 
adopting savings accounts suggests that there previously exist high costs associated with the 
informal channels of transferring remittances.   
The majority of the households reported that the informal channel used for transferring 
remittance is through a friend. Asking a friend to transfer remittance contains the risk of losing 
some or all of the remittances (e.g. the friend gets robbed or the money is stole on the way); it 
involves asking a favor from the friend, which may require future actions to repay the favor; and, 
it consists of a delay of receiving remittances since traveling could take several days in Malawi. 
Since the traditional informal channel consists of many risks, the bank channel is more favorable 
to the households. When the costs of using the formal channel dropped due to the expansion of 
financial access, households chose to use transfer more frequently and in larger amounts. 
Remittances are believed to be an important source of income for many families in 
developing countries. They are sent by family members, not by international development 
organizations or donors, so they allow households to spend on things they desire most. 
Additionally, they are effective in helping households cope with unexpected natural disasters and 
tragedies. Studies have shown that remittances are not only used by households in meeting 
consumption needs, but are also used for savings and investments.
4
 Unlike foreign aid, 
remittances are directly received by families in need, and would serve more household’s interests 
and be more effective in fostering economic development.  
         The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of 
remittance. Section III describes the randomized experiment and data. Section IV presents the 
                                               
4
 Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) examines the sources of investment capital in Mexico. They find that almost more 
than a third of the capital invested in microenterprises is associated with remittances in ten of the Mexican states 
with the highest rate of migration to the United States.  
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empirical specification. Section V shows the effect of receiving information treatment and 
adopting formal savings on remittances transfers respectively. Section VI concludes.  
 
 
II. Background & Overview of Remittances 
a. Background and Sampling 
 Malawi is among the poorest countries in the world. According to the United Nations 
Human Development Index (HDI), which measures health, education, and standard of living, 
Malawi had an HDI value of 0.445 in 2014. This places the country as the 173rd poorest nation 
out of 187.  In 2014, 61.64% of the population lived on under $1.25 a day and 89.3% were living 
on under $2 a day.  
 The dataset was collected in 2008 (baseline) and in 2010 (post-experiment) through a 30-
page structured household survey, which was translated into the Malawian local language and 
then translated back into English after completion. The survey team consisted of university-
educated locals, who were trained to conduct the interview. Each interview lasted between 1.5 
and 2.5 hours. The households received neither monetary rewards nor cash gifts for completing 
the interview; despite this, since the interview was conducted at a time when labor demand was 
low, 97% of the households agreed to participate in the interview. In 2008, households were 
randomly chosen to be interviewed
5
; in 2010, researchers tried to interview the same set of 
households, with the exception of those that had moved over time and could not be located. The 
                                               
5
 In order to generate a truly random sample, the random walk approach was used. It was implemented in the 
following way. First, the total number of households in the village was divided by the total number of samples 
needed from the village to obtain a sampling interval. For example, if a village has 100 households and the team 
needs to sample 10 teams from the village, the sampling interval X will be 10. Second, the team would start at the 
center of the village, with each interviewer facing a different direction. For each interviewer, a number n was 
randomly selected from 1 to X. The interviewer would then walk in that direction and stop in front of the Nth 
household he or she encountered. When the interview was completed, the interviewer then continued in the same 
direction until he or she reached the Xth next household.  
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total number of households that were dropped out of the dataset due to attrition was 343.  In 
addition, due to unforeseen sampling issues and management problems, four pairs of villages had 
to be dropped. The remaining dataset contained 56 pairs, 112 clusters, from about 325 villages, 
with a total of 2,118 households. 
The survey designed for this experiment looked at a wide range of household 
characteristics such as savings, loans, income to food security, and others. Specific sections in 
the survey that is pertinent to this paper are section M and section O, which asked households 
about savings and remittances respectively. In Section M, the questions can be divided into two 
categories: one tried to uncover why people have savings accounts, while the other looked at 
reasons that could potentially deter people from opening up savings accounts.  
 
b. Descriptive Statistics and Balance Check 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of selected household characteristics in the 
baseline sample. Column 1 reports the sample mean and standard deviation of each variable. 
Column 2 reports the estimates of the coefficient and the standard errors of the difference 
between the means in the treatment and control groups in the baseline sample. Standard errors 
are clustered since errors may not be independent on the village level.  
The majority of the households (85%) are male-headed, on average forty-one years old, 
and roughly one-third of them had primary school education. The average size of a household is 
just over five people. The majority of people works in agriculture, with the exception of about 
27% of the households own and operate a non-agricultural business and 16%  have a job that 
pays salary.  
7 
Access to a formal savings account is limited to the households in the baseline sample. 
Only 12% of the sample report having a savings account. Since access to savings is generally a 
criterion when applying for loans, only 6%  in the sample report having formal loans. The 
average total balance of a household’s formal and informal savings is MWK 2,949 (USD 23.59). 
The average value of physical assets is MWK 27,595 (USD 220.76). The average distance from 
the bank stop is roughly 8km.  
Since there are 341 households dropped out of the endline sample because of attrition, I 
run a regression of attrition on the treatment dummy to test if households that dropped out of the 
study are different from households that did not. Since the regression shows that attrition has no 
predictable power for the treatment dummy, it shows that attrition is not a problem here.  
Column 2 reports the estimates of the demographic characteristics on the treated and 
control groups. It shows that the information treatment is as good as randomly assigned. None of 
the demographic characteristics, except the size of household (which is significant at 5 percent 
significance level), has explanatory power over assignment into the treatment group. Because of 
the “random walk” sampling, the coefficient of the household size, despite being statistically 
significant, should not suggest that larger households are more likely to be included in the 
treatment group. 
In conclusion, the estimates of the means in the treatment and control groups, as well as 
the simple regression coefficients, suggest that the treatment group is not different from the 
control group.   
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c. Overview of Remittance In The Context of Malawi 
Why does a household have a savings account? 
 The questionnaire seeks to identify the primary, secondary, and tertiary reasons that a 
household holds a savings account. The most popular responses to the primary reason of holding 
a savings account were emergency fund for unexpected shocks (21.9%),  other (21%)
6
,  spouses, 
household members, relatives, friends may take or ask for money (20%),  required to get a loan 
(15%). 
 
Figure 1.1 Pie Chart Illustrating the Responses to the Primary Reasons for Opening Savings Accounts  
 
                                               
6
 In the sample, 117 households responded that they opened a savings account for “other” reasons that are not listed 
in the questionnaire. Out of these 117 responses, the most common reason was to “buy agricultural inputs”, which 
accounted for around 15percentage points of this sub-sample of 177 households. Other reasons included depositing 
proceeds from tobacco sales (as the tobacco industry is Malawi’s largest source of income), avoiding unnecessary 
spending, receiving or sending out money, and using as protection from thieves and fire. 
 
Required to get a loan 
Child's education Health expenses 
Buy business asset 
Buy business inventory 
Construct / repair 
house 
Buy bicycle 
Friends, family compel 
me 
Spouse, household 
members, relatives, 
friends may take or ask 
for money 
Interest rates are good 
Funeral fund 
Other 
Emergency fund for 
food 
Emergency fund for 
unexpected shocks 
9 
Figure 1.2 shows the secondary reasons that households hold savings accounts. Most 
people indicated that they had no more than one reason to hold a savings account, so they have 
exhausted their answers at this stage. The remaining sample of the households confirmed that 
they had other reasons besides their primary reason to hold savings accounts. For households in 
this category, the most common response is “emergency fund for unexpected shocks.” Shocks 
refer to unexpected tragedies a family may encounter, such as the death of a family member, 
death of livestock, natural disasters and others. Tertiary reason for holding a savings account 
reveals the same findings.  
 
  
Figure 1.2 Pie Chart Illustrating the Responses to the Secondary Reasons for Opening Savings Accounts  
 
These responses support the proposition that access to formal savings is a pathway out of poverty 
as it protects the poor against shocks; it promotes asset accumulation, and relaxes credit 
constraints. Besides the conventional wisdom that access to savings accounts will help the poor 
save, Ashraf et al. (2006) suggests that savings products with certain withdraw restrictions could 
help the poor overcome temptation problems and save more. As shocks arrive in lump-sum but 
Required to get a loan 
Child's education 
Health expenses 
Buy business asset Buy business inventory 
Pay laborers 
Construct / repair 
house 
Friends, family compel 
me 
Spouse, household 
members, relatives, 
friends 
Interest rates are good 
Other 
Emergency fund for 
food 
Emergency fund for 
unexpected shocks 
No more reasons 
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income comes in small installments for the poor, the poor could benefit from “saving for a rainy 
day.” In addition, keeping money away from family members, relatives, and friends will 
facilitate asset accumulation. For example, women are generally more concerned about saving 
than men. Many of the women would try to save on their own but they often face the pressure 
from their spouses to share their savings. Dupas and Robinson (2009) offer a savings account 
with negative interest rate to market women in Kenya but still observed high frequent, voluntary 
account usage among them, which suggested that these women generally faced negative private 
returns on the money they save informally. Finally, having savings accounts is sometimes a 
prerequisite to get a loan. As many of the poor is currently borrowing from the moneylenders at a 
rate of 40 -200%, enabling them to borrow from the formal credit market cuts the cost of 
borrowing significantly. Hence, opening savings accounts relax the credit constraint the poor 
faces.  
  
What prevents households from opening a savings account? 
The second set of the questions looks at factors that negatively incentivize people from 
opening up a savings account. Some potential candidates are: minimum opening balance 
requirement, application fee, identity proof required to open an account, number of times a 
person needs to travel to open an account, time spent on traveling to the bank, and cost of 
transportation, lodging and food. First, let us examine the issue of minimum opening balance. 
Minimum opening balance varies significantly among banks. Some banks do not have any 
balance requirement while others set theirs variously from 500 Malawi Kwacha ($0.85) to 1500 
Malawi Kwacha ($2.55). On a first glimpse, it is hard to tell if the minimum amount money 
needed in a bank account is a significant hurdle for many rural Malawians.  Since 89.3 
11 
percentage of the Malawians were living under $2 a day, it is not clear whether households had 
the capacity to set aside up to $2.55 in a bank account if they want to open an account. However, 
table 3 reveals that the average savings balance among households that adopted savings accounts 
was MWK 6927 (USD 55.42), which is significantly higher than the minimum opening balance. 
Therefore, it suggests the minimum opening balance was not an important hurdle. Most banks do 
not charge an application fee for opening up an account, which suggests that application fees 
should not be considered as an obstacle. For the identity proof question, most of the interviewees 
reported that banks require either none or easily obtainable forms of ID, which suggest that an ID 
is not a serious problem for residents who want to open an account.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Histogram Illustrating the Minimum Opening Balance for Households with Saving Accounts 
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Figure 1.4 Histogram Illustrating the Application Fee  
The data suggests that the main obstacle to opening a savings account is travel-related 
costs. On average, people were able to open a bank account after taking two or fewer trips to the 
bank. However, the time cost of making one trip to the bank each time is often great. 4 
percentage of the interviewees reported that they spent less than 5 hours on each trip to the bank; 
103 people said they spent 10 hours on travelling; 93 people reported 20 hours; another 80 
people reported 30 hours; 77 reported 40 hours; while 45 people reported 50 hours. The 88
th
 
percentile of travel time is two days, which means each time a Malawian wants to conduct a 
transaction in the bank, he or she needs to spend a day traveling to the bank, and another day 
traveling back.
7
 The costs incurred from traveling not only include direct transportation, lodging 
and food costs, but also implicit costs such as foregone wages. For Malawians who lived on 
minimum resources, it is easy to imagine how difficult it was for a household member to give up 
                                               
7
 The question is phrased in the following way, “Each time, on average, how long did it take you to travel each time 
you went to open the account?” So I assume it means time took to make a round-trip. 
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13 
two days of labor and spend extra money to travel to a bank just to open a savings account. Since 
the costs of traveling to a bank were so great, costs of opening up a savings account declined 
dramatically when the NGO sent out “mobile bank” buses to village centers, which shortened the 
distances between individuals and a bank significantly.  
 
 
    Figure 1.4 Histogram Illustrating the Time Spent Per Trip 
 
 
III. Experiment Design and Data 
Among the many barriers that stand between the poor and a formal savings account, 
distance is one crucial factor that is often overlooked. As the previous section demonstrates, the 
most important barrier that prevents the poor in rural Malawi from opening a bank account is 
distance from a bank. 88 percentage of the sampled interviewees reported that they spent up to 
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14 
two days traveling to a local bank branch to open an account. The implicit time costs, 
represented by the foregone wages, on top of the direct transportation, lodging, and food costs 
are too dear of expenditure for the poor in rural Malawi.  
In late 2007, in order to promote greater access of the poor to savings accounts, a local 
microfinance institute − Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM) − began expanding 
formal savings access through mobile bank buses to rural areas. The expansion rolled out in the 
three largest districts of central Malawi: Lilongwe, Mchinji, and Dedza. The mobile bank buses 
drove out from the capital Lilongwe and made six stops on a regular basis on two routes. To the 
west, the van stopped at the trading centers of Nsundwe and Kamwendo, as well as the town of 
Mchnji (about 110km west of Lilongwe). To the south, it stopped in the town of Nkhoma, 
Chimbiya, and ended in Dedza (about 90km southeast of Lilongwe). 
  The buses stopped at each of these trading centers on the same day every week – usually 
on the market day, in order to catch the buyers and sellers in the marketplace, who had cash on 
hand and most likely wanted to make a deposit into the savings accounts.   
 
The Information Treatment 
 The information treatment consisted of sending extension workers to visit each 
community periodically. Extension workers (such as agricultural officers and health workers) 
traveled to treated villages by foot or bicycle, and brought information on bank buses’ services 
and hours. This practice is designed to fit with Malawian locals’ instinct of trust. Researchers 
conducted half a dozen focus group discussions and identified the extension worker practice as a 
way to bring information to local communities in a trustworthy way. The rest of the paper is 
15 
devoted to analyze the effect of information treatment on account adoption and remittances 
transfers.   
The data collection process lasted for two periods. The baseline data was collected 
between February to April of 2008, during the pre-harvest “hungry” season, and before any 
significant take-up of mobile bank’s services occurred.8 The mobile bank first began its 
operations in August of 2007. However, the awareness for OIBM’s mobile bank service was  
still low at the end the experiment happened, as confirmed by focus group discussions in 2008. 
The endline data was taken around the same time in 2010 in four geographically diverse sites for 
the purpose of accounting for the diversity of the areas around the van stops and eliminate 
selection bias.  
Villages were first grouped into three different categories according to their distances to 
the bus stop: (i) within 5km, (ii) 5-10km;(iii) more than 10km. They were then further divided 
into either high or low population groups to form six population-distance clusters. From these 
clusters, two villages were randomly selected to form a pair. Within each pair, only one of the 
clusters was randomly selected to receive the treatment. Within one village, 6-10 households 
were randomly selected for surveying. Initially, 60 pairs (120 clusters) were sampled. 
Nevertheless, due to data loss and unforeseen complications, four pairs had to be dropped. The 
final panel contains 56 pairs, or 112 village clusters (about 325 villages), with a total of 2,461 
households.
9
 
 
 
                                               
8
 In Malawi, most of the households earn their incomes during one harvest, which lasts from late April to June in 
Central Malawi.  
9
 In some of the large villages, the EA may consist of only one village whilst in some of the smaller ones, the EA 
might include more villages.  
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IV. Empirical Specification 
Using a randomized field experiment, I estimate the effects of supplying information on 
mobile bank buses’ operations on the following aspects of households’ behavior:  1) received 
any remittances 2) the total amount of remittances received 3) sent any remittances 4) the total 
amount of remittances sent.
10
 One and three represent binary variables, which equal 1 if a 
household received or sent remittances in the past 12 months. Two and four are continuous 
variables which equal monetary value in Malawian Kwacha.  
I present two regression specifications. The first regression is a simple Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression of the information treatment on dependent variables of interest. It 
represents the Intention to Treat effects of information treatment on dependent variables of 
interest. The most basic regression specification is represented by equation 1. Fixed effects are 
used in equation 2 and 4 as the experiment was randomized on the village level. Standard errors 
are clustered at the village level, since outcomes for households in a given village may not be 
independent.  
 
Non-fixed effect, no controls: 
                                                       (1) 
 
Fixed effects, no controls: 
 
                                                    (2) 
 
Non-fixed effect, with controls: 
 
                                                (3) 
                                               
10
 These variables are coded as following in the question: 1) Has the households received any remittances in the past 
12 months?  2)  What was the total amount of remittances received in the past 12 months?  3) Has the households 
sent any remittances in the past 12 months?  4)  What was the total amount of remittances sent in the past 12 
months? 
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Fixed effects, with controls: 
 
                                            (4) 
 
 
    is the dependent variable of interest for household i in cluster j.     is an indicator of whether 
the household receives information treatment. The coefficient   measures the effect of receiving 
information treatment on the dependent variable of interest.     is a mean-zero error term. The 
subscript k indicates the EA pair.     is a vector that includes control variables. Controls include 
i) the total value of physical assets the household owned in 2008 (excluding land, livestock, and 
buildings), measured in tens of thousands of kwacha; (ii) if the household had a cell phone in 
2008; (iii) if someone in the household can write in Chichewa; (iv) whether the household 
received one or more cash gifts from another household during the pre-harvest period in 2010.     
 
                     1
st
 stage                                    Treatment on the Treated  
Distance                       Information Treatment               Behaviors related to remittances         
                    Intention to Treat     
 
The second set of regressions use a two-stage least square approach to study the effect of 
adopting savings accounts on remittance transfers, i.e. the Treatment on the Treated effect. It is 
represented by the following equations:  
 
Non-fixed effects, no controls: 
              ̂                                     (5) 
Fixed effects, no controls:  
18 
                 ̂                  (6) 
Non-fixed effects, with controls:  
             ̂                       (7) 
Fixed effects, with controls: 
                ̂                          (8) 
 
 
   ̂ is the fitted values of the saving dummy variable.      is the same set of controls that are introduced in 
the previous paragraph in this section.  
If assuming that the information treatment does not affect the household’s behavior 
related to remittance transfers other than through encouraging the households opening up a 
savings account, it is possible to estimate the effect of adopting savings accounts on remittance 
transfers by dividing the Intention to Treat effect ( represented by equation 1) by the first stage 
effect (
 
 
 .  
 The first stage of regression is represented as: 
                            (9) 
    represents a dummy variable which indicates if the household owns any formal savings 
accounts in 2010. The sample is restricted to a subset of households who do not own any formal 
savings accounts in 2008. Since this paper investigates the effect of adopting savings accounts, it 
is justifiable to only look at households which adopt formal savings accounts between 2008 and 
2010.     represents a binary variable, indicating if the household receives any information 
treatment.     is a mean-zero error term.  
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V. Results 
a. Effect on ever receiving remittances 
Table 4 estimates the effect of the information treatment on a household’s possibility of 
receiving remittances. Panel A represents non-attrition households and excludes four pairs of EA 
whose data is possibly contaminated due to complications happened in the data collection 
process.
11
 In order to test the effect of receiving information on households’ behavior of adopting 
savings accounts, I look at a subset of samples whose are supposed to be more sensitive to the 
information treatment. Panel B restricts the sample to households which were located three or 
more kilometers away from the nearest bus stop. Intuitively, households which were living 
further away from the trade centers were less likely to receive information on mobile bank buses’ 
services and hence, they were more likely to react to the information brought to them by the 
extension workers. Therefore, if the results show that the subsample with greater distance are 
more likely to change their behaviors related to remittances transfers along with the expansion, it 
indicates that the traveling costs to a bank was previously a constraint to households that lived 
further away. Since the expansion of financial services alleviated the travel costs to a bank, 
households that lived further away experienced a fall in the cost of using a bank, which 
encouraged them to engage more with remittance transfers. 
The result confirms this hypothesis. In Panel A (Column 1), receiving the information 
treatment is shown to increase the probability for a household to receive remittances by an 
estimated 2.5 percentage points (p-value, 0.142). It represents a 33 percentage points increase in 
the likelihood of receiving remittances, given the average percentage of households receiving 
                                               
11
 I also ran the regression with only excluding attrition households. However, the inclusion of these four pairs of 
EAs does not change the results significantly. In addition, when I repeat this exercise for households who are living 
further than 3km away from the bus stops, including these four pairs of EAs does not change the results significantly 
neither. The results are available upon request.  
20 
remittances in the sample is 7.5 percentage points (p-value = 0.000). The effect gets even 
stronger when I restrict the sample to communities that live at least three kilometers away from 
the nearest bus stop. Panel B (Column 1) shows that the information treatment leads to an 
estimated 60percentage points increase in the possibility of households that are living further 
away to receive remittances.  This suggests that households which live further away from the 
trade centers are more information sensitive than households which live closer. 
Information treatment has a bigger effect on households which live further away perhaps 
because households who live closer to the town centers could have already received the 
information on bus stops and bank services via other channels. It could also be due to the fact 
that the mobile bank services are a greater convenience to households which are further away 
since it cuts their costs of traveling to a bank branch more dramatically than for households 
which are close to bank branches. This finding has an important policy implication: it suggests to 
policy makers and leaders at non-profit organizations that, to achieve the greatest effect of a 
program, it is best to start with households which live furthest away from the public 
infrastructure.   
Column 2 reports the effect of the information treatment with fixed effects. Fixed effects 
regression has the attraction of making it possible to control for variables that have not or cannot 
be measured. The idea of fixed effects regression is to use each village as its own control, in 
order to take account for the unobserved individual characteristics. For example, if in some 
villages, there had been a long, established tradition of having young people leave and working 
as migrant workers, the households in these villages had a higher probability of receiving 
remittances. Because it is impossible to measure differences such as in the social network of each 
village, using fixed effects is a clever approach to account for such differences. The fixed effects 
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regression can account for both observed differences, such as village’s distance to the trade 
center, and unobserved differences, such as the social network of villages, among villages. If the 
question of interest is to know whether receiving the information treatment affects the 
probability of a household received remittance, assuming that nothing else had changed over the 
period of the experiment, the difference in the rate of receiving remittance between 2008 and 
2010 is the result of the information intervention. If those differences are averaged across all 
groups in the sample, the average of these estimates will be called the “treatment effect.” With 
the fixed effects approach, this estimate controls for all the stable characteristics of the 
household, including both the easily measurable variables such as the ownership of a cellphone, 
as well as variables that are more difficult to measure, such as the information network. While it 
does not control for time-varying variables such as wealth, these could be handled by measuring 
them and including them in the regression model.  
Since the randomization is done at the village level, including fixed effects removes the 
between-village variations and only focuses on the within village variations. Since each village is 
at different distance to the trade centers and it is reasonable to believe that distance affects the 
number of people who left the village and worked as migrant workers who supplied remittances, 
the average percentage of households who receive remittances in each village should be 
different. Using fixed effect allows each clustered pair of villages to have its own estimated 
average percentage of remittances received. Given each pair differs in characteristics, including 
fixed effects reports a more accurate result.  
The disadvantage of the fixed effects approach is that it generally has larger standard 
errors than the estimates from the random effects model. The reason is that the random effects 
use both the variations between and within groups while the fixed effects use only the within 
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group variations. Therefore, the fixed effects model generally discard information about 
difference among groups. Nevertheless, the fixed effects approach delivers a more accurate 
estimate. In social science studies, the tradeoff of precision for accuracy is valuable.  
This paper reports regression results using clustered standard errors in all tables. It is 
crucial to report the clustered standard error because standard error at the village level may not 
be independent, since it is reasonable to believe that shocks are at village level. For instance, 
natural disasters such as floods affect the entire village, and consequently, affect the income of 
all households in the village at a given year. In this case, it is important to use the clustered 
standard error to account for the dependency between households in the same village.  
Columns 3 – 4 report the results with controls. The control variables I included are 1) the 
total value of physical assets the household owned (excluding land, livestock, and buildings) in 
2008 2) ownership of a cell phone in 2008 3) if someone in the household can write in Chichewa 
4) if the household received one or more cash gifts from another household during the pre-
harvest period in 2010. Appendix A.1 reports the effect of the control variables on a household’s 
possibility of receiving a remittance. The coefficients of all the control variables are significant, 
which indicate that these variables affect the household’s probability of receiving a remittance.  
Consequently, failure to include them in the OLS equation would lead to the omitted 
variable bias, and lead to an incorrect estimate of the effect of the information treatment. A 
simple regression of information treatment on receiving a remittance explicitly assumes that 
there is no other channel, other than the information treatment channel, that affects the variation 
in household’s probability of receiving a remittance. However, if other variables also affect the 
household’s probability of receiving a remittance at the same time when the amount of 
information a household received changed, the simple OLS regression would incorrectly 
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attribute the change of the possibility of receiving remittances as a result of the changes in other 
variables as the result of the information treatment. If changes in other variables positively affect 
the probability of a household receiving a remittance, the OLS regression without controls would 
overstate the effect of the information treatment on receiving a remittance.  
The result in Appendix A.1 suggests that the simple OLS regression without controls 
likely overstates the effect of information treatment. Column 4 (Panel C) shows the effect of the 
information treatment on receiving remittances drops to 3.08 percentage (p-value = 0.018) when 
controls are added. As the previous paragraph analyzes, the drop in the magnitude of coefficients 
suggests the overall effect of the omitted variables on receiving remittances is positive. Appendix 
A.1 provides more insights on this discussion.  
 The OLS regression presented in Table 4 is the reduced form effect of the information 
treatment on the possibility of receiving remittances. This assumes that the information treatment 
only affects the possibility of receiving remittances through the channel of adopting a savings 
account. The following sections will examine this in more details.   
 
b. Effect on the amount of remittances received  
 Columns 5 – 8 report the effect of the information treatment on the amount of remittances 
a household received in the past twelve months. Column 5 (Panel A) reveals that the average 
amount of remittances households in the treated villages received in one year is MWK 1,133 
(USD 9.06)
12
 (p-value = 0.001) . Receiving the information treatment increases the amount of 
remittances received by MWK 262.7 (USD 2.10) (p-value = 0.575), which represents a 23 
percentage points increase.  
                                               
12
 Exchange rate between MWK and USD in 2008 is roughly 1MWK = 0.008USD. 
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 Panel B reveals that the effect of the information treatment is stronger for households 
which live further away from the nearest bus stop. Column 5 (Panel B) shows that the mean of 
the amount of remittances received by households that lived further away in the treated villages 
was MWK 737.5 (USD 5.9). In addition, the information treatment raised the amount of 
remittances received by these households by MWK 688 (USD 5.5) (p-value = 0.152). By 
summing up these two numbers, I conclude that the households that lived further away in the 
treated villages received a total amount of remittances MWK 1426.1 (USD 11.4). The average of 
the total amount of remittances received by all households in the treated villages was MWK 
1395.7 (USD 11.2). It shows that, given the same level of access to banks, households that lived 
further away also received similar amount of remittances as households that lived closer (since 
the man of the sample with only households lived further away and the mean of the sample with 
all households are close, the mean of the sample with only households lived close should not be 
drastically different from the mean of the group with only >3km households). More importantly, 
it suggests that, in the absence of the information intervention, households that lived further 
away received less remittance than households that lived close not because they had fewer 
numbers of relatives working in other parts of the country who supplied the remittance.  
The analysis suggests that there were previously high costs associated with receiving 
remittances for households that lived further away from the trade centers. Therefore, when the 
expansion via mobile bank buses greatly reduced the distance between households to a bank and 
the associated cost of using a bank, households are more likely to receive remittance transfers 
and receive great amounts of remittances.  
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c. Effect on ever sending remittances 
 Table 7 examines the effect of the information treatment on the likelihood a household 
sent remittance. Column 1 (Panel A) shows receiving the information treatment increases the 
probability of sending remittances by 1.53 percentage points (p-value = 0.10). Since only 3.8 
percentage of households in the sample had ever sent a remittance, a 1.53 percentage point 
increase represents a 40 percentage points increase of the likelihood of adoption in the control 
group. The effect of the information treatment becomes more significant when the sample is 
restricted to households that lived further away from the nearest bus stop. Column 1 (Panel B) 
shows the information treatment leads to an increase of 1.91 percentage points (p-value = 0.038) 
of the probability of sending a remittance, which is equivalent to a 65 percentage points increase 
in relative terms. The result shown by Table 7 is in line with the result shown by Table 4, which 
suggests that households which lived further away from the trade centers faced higher costs of 
using bank services.  
Columns 2 and 4 show the results with fixed effects and clustered standard error. The 
coefficients decrease slightly compares to Column 1 but remain significant. In Columns 2 and 4, 
the coefficient of the constant term is shown as negative, which leads to an odd interpretation. It 
seems to suggest that the households in the control group had a negative probability of sending a 
remittance, which was wrong since the probability is bounded between 0 and 1. However, the 
negative coefficient of the constant is not problematic in this case, since Column 2 reports the 
results with the fixed effects and Column 4 reports the results with controls. In both cases, the 
coefficient of the constant term merely reflects an estimate of the probability of households in 
the control villages sending a remittance.  
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The negative coefficient of the constant term in the fixed effects regression is not 
problematic because it does not provide an accurate reflection of the mean of the dataset. The 
fixed effects regression only looks at the within group variations in terms of the possibility of 
sending remittances. Each clustered pair has its own intercept with the y-axis (the possibility of 
sending a remittance). Some of the intercepts are positive; some are negative.  Therefore, the 
coefficient of the constant term is just an average of these constants.  
Similarly, the coefficient of the constant term in regressions with controls also appears as 
negative but is not problematic, since it is unlikely that the values of all predictors will be zero at 
the same time and yield a negative value for the dependent variable. The control variables 
include the total value of assets the household owned in 2008, cell phone ownership, ability to 
write in Chichewa, and whether a household received one or more cash gifts from another 
household. It is not likely that all these variables equal to zero for any household. In fact, in the 
dataset, the minimum value of assets the household owned in MWK 10. Therefore, the value of 
the control variables will not be zero at the same time for any of the households in the sample. 
Consequently, the negative coefficient just reflects an estimate of the possibility of sending a 
remittance for households in the control villages (it suggests that, in the control villages, the 
probability of a household had sent a remittance was close to zero).  
The regression result with controls is reported in Column 4. It suggests that the 
probability of a household in the treated group has sent remittance was 1.5 percentage points 
higher than that in the control group. Comparing to the effect of the information treatment on the 
probability of receiving remittance, the effect of the information treatment on sending remittance 
is much smaller. The reason is that the majority of the remittances flow from the migrant 
27 
workers to their families that live in the rural area. Therefore, rural households were much more 
likely to receive remittance than to send remittance.  
 
d. Effect on amount of remittances sent 
 Columns 5 – 8 in Table 7 report the effect of receiving the information treatment on the 
amount of remittances sent by a household. Column 5 (Panel A) in Table 7 shows that receiving 
the information treatment increases the amount of remittances sent by a household by MWK 876 
(USD 7.01) (p-value, 0.077). The average remittances sent by the households in Panel A are 
MWK 182 (USD 1.46) (p-value, 0.604), suggesting that the information treatment leads to a 
dramatic increase (a five-fold increase) of the amount of remittances sent by a household.  
It is plausible to conceive that the households previously relied on informal channels to 
send remittances to the family members, such as through post office or friends, who travel, 
experienced a dramatic decrease in the costs of using a bank when the expansion occurred. In the 
treatment group, the mobile bank service replaced the traditional, informal channels of sending 
remittances so the costs of sending remittance dropped for households when the buses arrived. 
Consequently, it encouraged the households to send larger amounts of money to families.  
The alternative reason is an increase in household savings, which enable households to 
send more remittances to relatives who lived away. Table 3 shows that the information treatment 
has a positive effect on the balances in the current accounts, which suggests that an increase in 
the amount of remittance sent could potentially be a result of the wealth effect. The effect is not 
statistically significant yet the regression shows that receiving the information treatment leads to 
an increase of MWK 544 (USD 3.8) in the current account balance. Since the survey does not 
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providence evidence on why households sent out remittances, I cannot rule separately analyze 
the two different channels and test which channel dominates.  
 
e. Effect of adopting savings accounts on remittances 
 To estimate the effect of adopting savings accounts on household’s behavior related to 
remittances, I deploy the instrumental variable approach. The instrumental variable approach 
establishes causality between the independent variable and the dependent variable by creating 
changes in an instrument variable, which only affects the outcome of the dependent variable 
through affecting the independent variable. Therefore, if it is correct that the instrument only 
affects the dependent variable through the dependent variable channel, it is reasonable to 
conclude that all variations in Y are caused by variations in Xs. Before I present the results of the 
instrumental variable approach, the next section discusses some of the fatal disadvantages of an 
OLS approach.  
 
f. Pitfalls of OLS 
 A simple OLS regression of the indicator variable of adopting formal savings on 
remittance variables is problematic because of the omitted variable bias. Column 2 in Appendix 
Table A.2 shows that the adoption of formal savings accounts leads to an increase of MWK 
3,455 (USD 276.4) of the amount of remittances a household received. The coefficient is 
significant at the 5 percentage significance level. Nevertheless, the 2SLS regression reveals a 
much more modest increase. Column 6 shows that the adoption of formal savings accounts leads 
to only an increase of MWK 2,329 (USD 18.63). The drop in the estimate suggests that the OLS 
regression overstates the effect of adopting savings accounts. It suggests that, in the absence of 
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control variables, the omitted variables lead to an increase in the amount of remittance a 
household received. One of the omitted variables could be income. Suppose the average 
household income increases between 2008 and 2010. As a result, due to the wealth effect, the 
amount of remittance a household receives would increase even in the absence of the adoption of 
savings accounts. Therefore, the OLS regression of the adoption of savings accounts incorrectly 
contributes the effect of the increase in household income as the effect of the adoption.  
 In contrast, the simple OLS regression seems to understate the effect of adoption on the 
possibility of receiving and sending remittances. Column 1 reports that the effect of adopting 
savings accounts increases a household’s possibility of receiving remittances by 3.65 percentage 
points while Column 5, under the instrumental variable approach, suggests that the effect is 
much greater (a 58.6 percentage points increase). Column 3 shows that adoption leads to an 
increase of 6.25 percentage points of the probability of a household sending remittance. 
However, Column 7 shows the effect is a 27.3 percentage points increase under the 2SLS 
approach. It suggests that the overall effects of the omitted variables on dependent variables of 
interest are negative. Hence, without controlling them in the regression, the effect of adoption 
appears to be smaller than its true effect. 
 
g. Two Stage Least Square 
 The Instrumental Variable (IV) approach is a regression technique used to solve the 
omitted variable problem. The IV chain in this paper is: 
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A good instrument should satisfy 1) random assignment 2) relevance – have an effect on 
the regressor 3) the exclusion restriction. The instrument chosen in this experiment is the 
information treatment. It satisfies the first restriction since the information treatment is randomly 
assigned (the method is discussed in section II). In addition, Table 5 shows the first stage effect 
of the information treatment on adoption. Columns 1 – 4 show that the information treatment 
increases the likelihood of households adopting a savings account by 3 percentage points; the 
coefficients are significant under 5 percentage significance level. Since 6% to 9 % of the 
households in the sample have formal savings accounts, a 3% increase in the likelihood of 
adopting a formal savings account due to information treatment is equivalent to a 30 percentage 
points to 50 percentage points increase on level of adoption in the control group. Since the first 
stage effect is significant, it shows that the information treatment satisfies the relevance 
restriction. Finally, it is important to carefully think about the exclusion restriction. The 
exclusion restriction states that the information treatment should only affect the remittance 
variables through adoption of savings accounts. In other words, the information treatment should 
not directly impact the household’s behavior related to remittances.  
Though it is impossible to test the exclusion restriction, evidence presented by the 
reduced form regression provides evidence to support the claim that the instrument does not 
affect remittance variables directly. In particular, Table 4 shows the heterogeneous effect of the 
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information treatment on the possibility of receiving remittances for households that lived further 
away from the trade centers versus that of households that lived closer. The fact that the 
information treatment has a stronger effect on households which lived further away suggests that 
the key variable affecting the possibility of receiving remittances is costs associated with 
receiving remittances – households lived further away has higher costs of receiving remittances 
since the time and expenditure they spent on traveling to a bank to receive transfers were greater. 
Therefore, it suggests that things related to the bank service affected the likelihood of receiving 
remittances – not the information treatment itself. Since all households in the treated villages 
received the information treatment and only households that lived further away in the treated 
villages were more responsive to the information treatment, it suggests that the information 
treatment itself does not affects the possibility of receiving remittance. Intuitively, it is also hard 
to think of a reason to justify that claim that receiving information on buses’ hours and services 
would increase the chance of a household receiving remittance. 
Table 6 shows the 2SLS effects of adoption savings accounts on receiving remittances. 
Columns 1-4 show the effect of account adoption on the possibility of households receiving 
remittances. Column 1 (Panel A) shows that adopting formal savings accounts leads to an 
increase of probability 58.6 percentage points (p-value = 0.253) for households receiving 
remittances. It suggests that adoption has a huge effect on the probability of households 
receiving remittances. The large magnitude of the coefficient seems to suggest that, in the 
absence of owning a savings account, households receive remittances through informal channels 
which may involve some sort of costs. For instance, in the survey, many households report that 
they receive remittances through friends. Asking a friend to take back the remittances involve the 
risk of losing some or all of the remittances (e.g. the friend gets robbed or the money is stole on 
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the way); it involves asking a favor from the friend, which may require future actions to repay 
the favor; and, it consists of a delay of receiving remittances since traveling could take several 
days in Malawi. Because the traditional informal channel involves many risks, the bank channel, 
in the context that the costs of traveling to banks drops significantly, becomes more favorable to 
the households. As a result, as shown in Column 1(Panel A), adopting formal savings leads to a 
significant increase in the probability of receiving remittances.  
Column 2 (Panel B) in Table 6 shows that adopting savings accounts increases the 
probability of receiving remittances for households in the treated group by 63.3 percentage 
points (p-value,0.096) . More importantly, the result is statistically significant. It provides strong 
evidence that adopting formal savings leads to a significant increase in the probability of 
receiving remittance, which suggests that the provision of mobile bank services eliminates some 
of the constraints that had prevented households from receiving remittances.  
Section II provides descriptive information sampled from the responses from households, 
which indicates that the distance to a bank is the greatest factor preventing households from 
opening a bank account since traveling to a bank took several days in rural Malawi. The 2SLS 
result shows that, after reducing costs associated with traveling, households were much more 
likely to receive remittances.  
 Table 6 also shows that adopting formal savings leads to a dramatic increase in the 
amount of remittances received. Though none of the coefficients are significant, their magnitudes 
are significant. However, the magnitude of the coefficients at least provides suggestive evidence 
that adoption of savings accounts leads to an increase of household’s engagement with 
remittance transfers. For example, in Column 6 (Panel B), it is estimated that adoption leads to 
an increase of MWK 8,442 (USD 59) (p-value, 0.395) of the amount of remittances a household 
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received. Even though the coefficient of the remittance variable is statistically insignificant, a 
large, positive value like MWK 8,4442 suggests that the effect of adopting savings accounts is 
strongly likely to be positive. Therefore, though the results in the 2SLS are mostly statistically 
insignificant, they still provide suggestive evidence on the effect of adoption on remittance 
variables of interest.   
In particular, it is worthwhile to examine the possible reasons why adopting savings 
accounts will lead to an increase in the amount of remittances received by households. One of 
the possible reasons could be an elimination of household’s safety concern over the transferring 
money. Households may have concerns about the safety of the money when remittances are 
transported by friends because the money can be stolen or lost. Thus, when the safety concern 
was erased if the money was transferred through banks, households would welcome their 
relatives to send back more money through this safe channel.  
 Table 8 provides suggestive evidence that adoption increases the likelihood of household 
sending remittances as well. In Column 2 (Panel B), it shows that adoption leads to a 23.5 
percentage points increase in the probability of sending remittances for households that lived 
further away. Potential reasons could be 1) an increase in the savings balance and/or 2) a 
reduction in the costs of sending remittances. Column 6 (Panel B) shows that adoption leads to 
an increase of MWK 10,563 (USD 74) (p-value, 0.165) of the amount of remittances sent, which 
is a significant increase. I suspect that such huge increases are unlikely, given the low level of 
living in Malawi. The standard errors are large so the lower bound of confidence interval 
includes magnitudes of increase that are more moderate.  
  The 2SLS approach provides suggestive evidence that adoption of savings accounts leads 
to increase in the likelihood of households receiving/sending remittances and the amount of total 
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transfers. Unfortunately, the estimates of the coefficients are not statistically significant except in 
one specification (2SLS regression of account adoption on the possibility of receiving remittance 
with fixed effects, clustered standard error – Column 2 (Panel B)). However, the 2SLS 
regression at least suggests that the effect of account adoption is likely to be positive on the 
remittance variables of interests since the coefficients of the variables are exclusively positive.  
  
VI. Conclusion 
Using a randomized field experiment in rural Malawi, I looked at the effect of adopting 
savings accounts on remittances flows among household members. The experiment consisted of 
an information treatment, which provided information to households in the treated villages on the 
hours and operations of the mobile bank buses.  I first compared the effect of the information 
treatment on remittance variables of interest for households in the treated versus control villages. 
I found that the information treatment leads to an increase in the probability of households 
receiving remittances in the treated villages, as well as an increase in the amount of remittances 
received. In particular, the effect is strongest for households that lived at least three kilometers 
away from the trade centers, which suggests that the main cost of transferring remittance is 
related to distance. Second, the information treatment also leads to an increase in households’ 
possibility of sending remittances, as well as the amount of remittances sent. The effect on 
sending remittances is not as large as the effect on receiving remittances, which suggests that 
most of the households received net inflows of transfers from family members who worked or 
lived in other parts of Malawi. 
The 2SLS regression provides suggestive evidence that adopting savings accounts leads 
to an increase in engaging in remittance activities. The 63.3 percentage increase in the possibility 
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of households receiving remittances after adopting savings accounts suggests that there 
previously exist high costs associated with remittance transfers in the absence of mobile bank 
services. The use of the formal bank channel reduces these costs, and hence, encourages 
households to use more remittance transfers. 
 Future research should look at the uses of the remittances (e.g. how the households use 
the money they receive? Use family transfers to cope with unexpected shocks? Do they spend on 
consumption? Or do they invest in agricultural inputs?) and analyze the change in welfare as a 
result of increasing uses of remittance. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1.1 Map of Malawi 
 
  
Description: The Physical Map of Malawi showing major geographical features like elevations, mountain ranges, deserts, 
lakes, plateaus, peninsulas, rivers, plains, landforms and other topographic features of Malawi. Source: Elizon Maps.  
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Figure 1.2 Map of research sites 
  
 
Source: Ferguson, Michael, "Branchless Banking and Rural Outreach in Malawi: Opportunity International Bank of 
Malawi‘s Impact on the Market."Microfinance Opportunities, Mai (2011), p9. 
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TABLE 1 – SUMMARY STATISTICS AND BALANCE CHECK 
    
Demographic 
Characteristics 
Sample mean 
(std. 
deviation)  
Coefficients on 
treatment  
Observations 
    
Head of Household is 
Male 
0.85 
(0.36) 
0.026 
(0.018) 
2,335 
    
Head Has Primary 
Education 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.037 
(0.041) 
2,337 
    
Head’s Age (years) 41.00 
(13.84) 
-0.000 
(0.856) 
2,403 
 
 
    
Household Size 5.13 
(1.98) 
0.208** 
(0.103) 
2,335 
 
Bank-Stop Distance 
(km) 
7.92 
(3.38) 
0.14 
(0.64) 
2,335 
    
Operate Business 0.27 
(0.44) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
2,334 
 
    
Has Member with 
Salaried Job 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
2,335 
    
Formal and Informal 
Account Balances 
(Kwacha) 
2,949 
(27,281) 
1,337 
(1,583) 
2,335 
 
    
Physical Assets 
(Kwacha) 
27,595 
(146,818) 
4,111 
(8,230) 
2,335 
    
Has Formal Savings 0.12 
(0.32) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
2,329 
    
Has Formal Loans 
 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
2,332 
 
Attrition 
 
0.14 
(0.35) 
 
-0.002 
(0.033) 
 
2,335 
Notes: Exchange rate was approximately 1MWK = 0.008USD in 2008. This table reports the descriptive statistics 
for households in 2008. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 2 – INFORMATION EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD ADOPTION OF FORMAL SAVINGS 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Adopt formal 
savings 
Adopt formal 
savings 
   
information 0.0303 0.0306** 
 (0.0187) (0.0138) 
Constant 0.0927*** 0.0645*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0176) 
FE  Y 
Observations 1,882 1,882 
R-squared 0.002 0.062 
Notes: The table shows estimates from linear regressions on decision to open a formal savings account. The sample 
is restricted to those households that did not have any formal savings account in 2008. The response variable is an 
indicator equal to 1 if a household has a formal savings account in 2010. Cluster robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
TABLE 3 – INFORMATION EFFECTS ON SAVINGS BALANCE 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Current Balance 
  
information 544.2 
 (2,590) 
Constant 6,927*** 
 (1,737) 
  
Observations 237 
R-squared 0.000 
Notes: The table shows estimates from linear regressions on account balances. The sample is restricted to those 
households that did not have any formal savings account in 2008. The response variable is a continuous variable 
which shows the current balances of household savings account(s). Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 4. OLS - EFFECTS OF INFORMATION TREATMENT ON RECEIVING REMITTANCES 
 
 Dependent variable  
                                           Possibility of Receiving Remittances                                                                                                Amount of Remittances Received 
Observations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
PANEL A: Dropped attrition households and households which data were possibly contaminated  
 
  
information 0.0257 0.0214 0.0208 0.0184 262.7 196.2 89.06 70.58 
 (0.0174) (0.0130) (0.0152) (0.0118) (530.9) (418.9) (458.4) (366.7) 
Constant 0.0772*** 0.103*** 0.00752 0.0353 1,133*** 643.0 30.86 -590.8 
 (0.0125) (0.0302) (0.0117) (0.0250) (352.2) (661.9) (236.1) (544.3) 
Observations 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 
 
PANEL B: Restrict to Communities >3km from the nearest bus stop 
 
 
 
 
  
information 0.0370** 0.0346** 0.0322** 0.0308** 688.0 688.6* 498.6 523.4 
 (0.0175) (0.0138) (0.0160) (0.0128) (524.2) (391.1) (460.7) (341.7) 
Constant 0.0623*** 0.0923*** 0.00245 0.0302 737.8*** 249.1 -147.1 -932.1 
 (0.0114) (0.0334) (0.0123) (0.0291) (271.6) (754.9) (234.5) (631.8) 
Observations 1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 
 
1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 
 
Fixed Effects  
Clustered 
Standard Error 
Controls 
N 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
N 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A dropped attrition households and four pair of EA should potentially be excluded 
from the dataset due to possible contamination of the data in the information collection process. Panel B dropped attrition households, households with 
potentially contaminated information, and restrict to household which are located three or more kilometers from the nearest bus stop. Controls include 1) Assets 
2008 is the total value of physical assets the household owned in 2008 (excluding land, livestock, and buildings), measured in tens of thousands of kwacha, 2) 
Cell Phone 20008 is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the household had a cell phone in 2008, 3) Literate 2008 takes a value of 1 if someone in the household 
can write in Chichewa, 4) Received Cash Gift 2010 is an indicator for whether the household received one or more cash gifts from another household during the 
pre-harvest period in 2010.          
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TABLE 5. 2SLS – FIRST STAGE EFFECT OF INFORMATION TREATMENT ON ADOPTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table shows the first stage effect of information treatment on adopting formal savings accounts.  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Adopt formal 
savings 
Adopt formal 
savings 
Adopt formal 
savings 
Adopt formal 
savings 
 
information 
 
0.03** 
 
0.03** 
 
0.03** 
 
0.03** 
 (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0185) (0.014) 
Constant 0.0927*** 0.064 0.093*** 0.064*** 
 (0.009) (0.066) (0.012) (0.0175) 
Observations 1,882 1,882 1,882 1,882 
R-squared 0.0024 0.062 0.002 0.062 
Fixed Effects  
Clustered 
Standard Error 
Controls 
N 
N 
 
N 
Y 
N 
 
N 
N 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
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TABLE 6. 2SLS - EFFECTS OF ACCOUNT ADOPTION ON RECEIVING REMITTANCES 
 
 Dependent variable  
                                           Possibility of Receiving Remittances                                                                          Amount of Remittances Received 
Observations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
PANEL A: Dropped attrition households and households which data were possibly contaminated  
 
  
Adopt formal 
savings 
0.586 0.376 0.593 0.348 2,329 -840.0 5,854 -1,228 
 (0.607) (0.404) (0.737) (0.429) (15,220) (12,312) (14,202) (17,070) 
Constant 0.0157 0.102* -0.000280 0.0720* 705.9 985.5 -120.2 67.83 
 (0.0678) (0.0596) (0.0231) (0.0430) (1,622) (1,310) (751.9) (470.9) 
Observations 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,593 1,784 
 
PANEL B: Restrict to Communities >3km from the nearest bus stop 
 
    0.011 0.023 
Adopt formal 
savings 
0.681 0.633* 0.711 0.637 8,617 8,442 5,854 5,788 
 (0.500) (0.380) (0.624) (0.446) (12,142) (9,933) (13,636) (11,005) 
Constant 0.00165 0.0788 -0.00545 0.0743 -14.36 141.7 -120.2 -500.4 
 (0.0554) (0.0620) (0.0235) (0.0538) (1,232) (1,239) (433.1) (762.0) 
Observations 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 
 
Fixed Effects  
Clustered 
Standard Error 
Controls 
N 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
N 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A dropped attrition households and four pair of EA should potentially be excluded 
from the dataset due to possible contamination of the data in the information collection process. Panel B dropped attrition households, households with 
potentially contaminated information, and restrict to household which are located three or more kilometers from the nearest bus stop. Controls include 1) Assets 
2008 is the total value of physical assets the household owned in 2008 (excluding land, livestock, and buildings), measured in tens of thousands of kwacha, 2) 
Cell Phone 20008 is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the household had a cell phone in 2008, 3) Literate 2008 takes a value of 1 if someone in the household 
can write in Chichewa, 4) Received Cash Gift 2010 is an indicator for whether the household received one or more cash gifts from another household during the 
pre-harvest period in 2010.          
 
46 
 
TABLE 7. OLS - EFFECTS OF INFORMATION TREATMENT ON SENDING REMITTANCES 
    
 Dependent variable  
                                           Possibility of Sending Remittances                                                                          Amount of Remittances Sent 
Observations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
PANEL A: Dropped attrition households and households which data were possibly contaminated  
 
  
information 0.0153 0.0133* 0.0121 0.0116 876.5* 956.6** 751.2* 862.7** 
 (0.0112) (0.00774) (0.0101) (0.00719) (492.2) (386.5) (424.2) (337.6) 
Constant 0.0381*** -0.0107 0.00898 -0.0381*** 182.4*** -765.3** -353.5 -1,620*** 
 (0.00733) (0.00693) (0.00885) (0.0114) (60.60) (381.3) (220.1) (602.9) 
Observations 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 
 
PANEL B: Restrict to Communities >3km from the nearest bus stop 
 
    0.011 0.023 
information 0.0191* 0.0168** 0.0164 0.0151** 402.4 420.2* 313.9 347.0* 
 (0.0110) (0.00776) (0.0102) (0.00725) (295.2) (222.1) (230.6) (183.5) 
Constant 0.0294*** -0.0134* 0.00887 -0.0336*** 155.7** -336.1 -125.7 -752.9** 
 (0.00639) (0.00734) (0.00945) (0.0115) (64.15) (203.0) (117.1) (356.6) 
Observations 1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 
Fixed Effects  
Clustered 
Standard Error 
Controls 
N 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
N 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A dropped attrition households and four pair of EA should potentially be excluded 
from the dataset due to possible contamination of the data in the information collection process. Panel B dropped attrition households, households with 
potentially contaminated information, and restrict to household which are located three or more kilometers from the nearest bus stop. Controls include 1) Assets 
2008 is the total value of physical assets the household owned in 2008 (excluding land, livestock, and buildings), measured in tens of thousands of kwacha, 2) 
Cell Phone 20008 is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the household had a cell phone in 2008, 3) Literate 2008 takes a value of 1 if someone in the household 
can write in Chichewa, 4) Received Cash Gift 2010 is an indicator for whether the household received one or more cash gifts from another household during the 
pre-harvest period in 2010.          
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TABLE 8. 2SLS - EFFECTS OF ACCOUNT ADOPTION ON SENDING REMITTANCES 
    
 Dependent variable  
                                           Possibility of Sending Remittances                                                                          Amount of Remittances Sent 
Observations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
PANEL A: Dropped attrition households and households which data were possibly contaminated  
 
  
Adopt formal 
savings 
0.273 0.261 0.239 0.248 31,399 35,510 32,796 36,560 
 (0.313) (0.237) (0.383) (0.263) (27,392) (21,864) (32,235) (24,181) 
Constant 0.00965 -0.0237 0.00658 -0.0301** -2,780 -3,228 -965.9 -1,165 
 (0.0332) (0.0221) (0.0118) (0.0119) (2,764) (2,093) (917.3) (1,106) 
Observations 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 
 
PANEL B: Restrict to Communities >3km from the nearest bus stop 
 
    0.011 0.023 
Adopt formal 
savings 
0.226 0.235 0.213 0.230 8,652 10,563 7,576 9,886 
 (0.220) (0.173) (0.268) (0.202) (8,917) (7,600) (8,765) (7,824) 
Constant 0.00882 -0.0214 0.00823 -0.0197* -589.7 -960.3 -245.2 -662.7 
 (0.0221) (0.0163) (0.0109) (0.0114) (815.0) (717.8) (288.6) (456.0) 
Observations 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 
Fixed Effects  
Clustered 
Standard Error 
Controls 
N 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
N 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A dropped attrition households and four pair of EA should potentially be excluded 
from the dataset due to possible contamination of the data in the information collection process. Panel B dropped attrition households, households with 
potentially contaminated information, and restrict to household which are located three or more kilometers from the nearest bus stop. Controls include 1) Assets 
2008 is the total value of physical assets the household owned in 2008 (excluding land, livestock, and buildings), measured in tens of thousands of kwacha, 2) 
Cell Phone 20008 is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the household had a cell phone in 2008, 3) Literate 2008 takes a value of 1 if someone in the household 
can write in Chichewa, 4) Received Cash Gift 2010 is an indicator for whether the household received one or more cash gifts from another household during the 
pre-harvest period in 2010.          
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Appendix 
APPEXDIX TABLE A.1 
IMPACTS OF CONTROLS ON RECEIVING REMITTANCES 
VARIABLES Possibility of Receiving Remittances 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Assets in 2008 1.54e-07***    
 (5.13e-08)    
Cell phone in 2008  0.168***   
  (0.0216)   
Household member 
can write in 
Chichewa 
  0.0740***  
   (0.0209)  
Received cash gifts 
in 2010 
   -0.0399* 
    (0.0227) 
Constant 0.132*** 0.114*** 0.0730*** 0.138*** 
 (0.00748) (0.00780) (0.0193) (0.00850) 
     
Observations 2,458 2,458 2,458 2,117 
R-squared 0.004 0.024 0.005 0.001 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the effect of control variable on the possibility of a household had received 
remittances in the past twelve months. Controls include 1) Assets 2008 is the total value of physical assets the household owned in 2008 (excluding land, 
livestock, and buildings), measured in tens of thousands of kwacha, 2) Cell Phone 20008 is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the household had a cell phone 
in 2008, 3) Literate 2008 takes a value of 1 if someone in the household can write in Chichewa, 4) Received Cash Gift 2010 is an indicator for whether the 
household received one or more cash gifts from another household during the pre-harvest period in 2010. 
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APPEXDIX TABLE A.2  
THE INCORRECT OLS ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECT OF ACCOUNT ADOPTION ON REMITTANCE VARIABLES 
Note: The regression output is restricted to the sample with non-attrition households and 56 pairs of EAs (dropped four pairs of EAs whose data could potentially 
be contaminated). Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent Variable  
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Possibility of 
receiving 
remittances 
Amount of 
remittances 
received 
Possibility of 
sending 
remittances 
Amount of 
remittances 
sent 
Possibility of 
receiving 
remittances 
Amount of 
remittances 
received 
Possibility of 
sending 
remittances 
Amount of 
remittances 
sent 
         
Adopt formal 
savings 
0.0365 3,455** 0.0625*** 4,347 0.586 2,329 0.273 31,399 
 (0.0252) (1,729) (0.0207) (2,704) (0.607) (15,220) (0.313) (27,392) 
Constant 0.133*** 595.0 -0.00568*** -395.2 0.0157 705.9 0.00965 -2,780 
 (0.0394) (750.0) (0.00216) (256.9) (0.0678) (1,622) (0.0332) (2,764) 
         
Observations 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 
 
 
50 
 
 
I. Cover Page of the Survey 
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II. Questionnaire used to collect information on remittances received/sent.
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III. Data Manipulation 
a. Variables:  
o05 - the number of times a household receives remittances; 
o06 - the amount received through each channel;  
o17 - the number of times a household sends remittances;  
o18 - the amount of remittances sent through each channel 
b. In the sample, only 186 households ever received remittances and 95 households ever 
sent remittances. In order to have a reasonable dataset size to make regression results 
sensible
13
 and use the data in a form that best reflects the effect of the adoption of  a 
saving account, I did the following transformations. 
i. I recoded all missing values of o05 and o17 to 0. The result is the number of 
observations (with only attrition households dropped) jumps from 186 and 96 to 
2118. 
ii. In the sample, there are households which had received remittances through 
multiple channels. In the old dataset, these households will have more than one 
line as each line reflects each distinct channel: 
Qno District Village Head O05 O06 O08 O09a O09b 
1011 Lilongwe Chimwaye Handizeni 
Kachidede 
2 1100 Friends 20 Kilometers 
1011 Lilongwe Chimwaye Handizeni 
Kachidede 
1 500 friends 30 Kilometers 
Note: qno is a unique household identification number. 
                                               
13
 In statistics, two things - confidence interval and statistical power - are related to sample size. A larger sample size 
will generate a smaller confidence interval, which improves one’s certainty that the true estimate lies within the 
range given by confidence interval. In addition, a larger sample size reduces the randomness of a sample. In 
statistics, p-value measures the likelihood that the treatment group is truly different from the control group. 
Researchers typically reject any p-value that is above 5percentage points, since it means with less than 95percentage 
points certainty, one can conclude that coefficient of the treated group is truly different from the coefficient of 
control group. 
54 
The explanation for this example household is the same household received 3 remittances 
of a total of 1600MWK in the past twelve months. The household received 1100MWK 
through two separate transactions via a friend who lived 20 kilometers away. The 
remaining 500MWK came through a single transaction from a friend who lived 30 
kilometers away. 
iii.       Since it makes no sense to regress upon remittances received through multiple 
channels of a single household, I collapsed the dataset so that each variable reflects only 
the total. For example, after collapse, the example household will only have one line that 
looks like: 
Qno District Village Head O05 O06 
1011 Lilongwe Chimwaye Handizeni 
Kachidede 
3 1600 
 
iv. The final transformation I did is to recode o05(number of times a household 
receives remittances) and o17(number of times a household sends remittances) to 
a 0/1 dummy variable since I am more interested in examining the effect of 
adoption on the likelihood of first-time usage of remittances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
